

MS4 old PTO
p/12

L-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----#-----R
MEMORANDUM

TO: James A. Abrahamson
FROM: Klaus P. Heiss
RE: European Considerations in Defense of SDI
DATE: August 23, 1984

An approach to the defense of the SDI initiative was outlined in the "Safeguard" memorandum which is of critical importance to the programmatic survival of the President's initiative. An important aspect in any such defense is the European support or lack of support for the initiative. In this memorandum, European aspects of the defense of SDI are discussed.

The fundamental issues outlined in the "Safeguard" memorandum obviously apply even more to Europe. Due to the particular historical and geographical facts, additional, peculiarly European issues arise from the SDI initiative which have to be properly anticipated, valued and integrated into the defense of SDI.

Just as was the case with the Enhanced Radiation Weapons issue, the primary Soviet approach in the international arena may well be to generate substantial European opposition to the SDI concept so that the program is ultimately defeated in the United States. Rather than leave the field to such campaigns of Soviet misinformation aimed at undermining European understanding and support, the US should take the initiative and elaborate the profound and positive changes the SDI initiative will bring to the long term outlook of European security, independence and unity.

1. SDI and Western Europe

1.1 Removal of the constant and immediate threat of nuclear annihilation: a system that would be effective against long range and medium range nuclear missile systems would assure this for all of Western Europe except the immediate adjoining areas (i.e., West Germany) and truly "liberate" Europe from what must be considered an unhealthy state of mind (which has existed ever since the 1940's).

1.2 A system that would be effective against long range strategic missiles only still would achieve a most significant objective for the Western Alliance -- namely it

dissimilar to that immediately following World War II, with absolute assured Western supremacy -- indeed, monopoly -- in strategic nuclear systems).

1.3 SDI also would enhance any European nuclear deterrence forces, since these clearly now could be used in case of Soviet attack under the umbrella of the larger US strategic umbrella, which negates to the Soviets the outright use of their strategic forces.

1.4 Because of the remaining relative exposure of West Germany, again it is important that Germany participate as a co-equal in any European nuclear theater of strategic forces -- be it in the financing, research or production, deployment and potential use of such forces. Once granted, such participation will once and for all cement the German situation in the Western alliance -- something currently left open and skillfully played upon by the Soviets (see Austrian State Treaty of 1956).

1.5 Should 1.1 be achieved (i.e., removal of nuclear annihilation threat), the European alliance will be able to safeguard European and Western interests more confidently in the nearby regions, first and foremost in the Middle East. This can lead to a substantial better sharing of the burden of Western defense efforts and costs.

1.6 Moreover, given 1.1 Western Europe is likely to become more autonomous in its own thinking -- in part as a reaction to the unique and dramatic US capabilities that a fully deployed SDI system implies. Some shortsighted people on both sides of the Atlantic may regard this as a disadvantage, but so do some parents who have difficulties in letting their children grow and achieve sustenance outside the confines of the immediate family.

1.7 The overall cohesion of the Western alliance, of course, would be assured for a long time to come because the SDI umbrella uniquely makes these dramatic changes possible.

2. SDI, Europe and the Soviet Union

2.1 Total opposition of the Soviet Union to the SDI capability in the European theater: aside from nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has little with which it can intimidate the Western European partners. In conventional weapons the Soviet Union may hold a numerical advantage here and there,

of providing for their own regional defense once they increase their relative defense efforts. Still, some Allies may find it difficult to leave the mother's womb of US military preeminence, even under the umbrella of SDI.

2.2 Recovery of US strategic deterrence credibility for European theater conflicts: with SDI implemented only by the US (and not the Soviet Union), the nuclear strategic umbrella may again become credible and even allow a substantial reduction in United States European defense-related expenditures.

2.3 Sharing of SDI capabilities with the Soviet Union: if the SDI capabilities were shared at some future time by the US with the Soviet Union, that in itself would imply such an extraordinary change in the psychological and political situation in Europe, and worldwide, that it is difficult to see how that state of "Shared Space Defense" can but have very profound, positive effects on the European scene. Clearly such a "sharing" would only come about with a realignment of the European situation: the sharing of this most important capability of the United States would have to be within a framework of a new understanding of international relations in favor of basic Allied interests.

2.4 Opening of Intra-European Relations: SDI would change the current state of affairs, where the fear of nuclear war somehow drives European intellectuals like lemmings into the adoption of neutralist (or worse) positions and compromises with otherwise totalitarian ideologies and systems. With the successful implementation of SDI, the Soviet Union will lose the main threat against Eastern European nations that now succumb to the nuclear fist of the Soviets. While conventional forces may be impressive to some, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European subjects may well believe that it is only the nuclear threat that prevents Eastern European nations from rising against the despised regime. In the absence of nuclear retaliation, Western nations are likely to come to the active support of such genuine uprisings against tyranny.

2.5 Increased opportunity of European self-defense: room for independent Western European defense efforts with parallel increased independence from the US. With the elimination of the strategic nuclear Soviet threat, Western Europe may find the confidence of more autonomous defense efforts with less reliance on the US umbrella. Like welfare, any free service -- however well intentioned or benignly rendered -- is inferior to a situation where

change in European thinking and capabilities could only be regarded as the ultimate milestone of success of the approach put into place at the end of the Second World War by the United States.

2.6 A pluralistic, multilateral system of international relations with a secondary role for the Soviet Union: a pluralistic world with several strong Western centers of democracies and open markets, with their own autonomous defense capabilities would probably imply the ultimate demise of the Soviet System which, like most totalitarian systems, is apparently only capable of dealing with "dualistic" situations (e.g., Soviet vs. US). The Soviet oligarchy gets lost in the chaos of open markets with a free flow of information and a combination of competition, greed, free trade and a worldwide flow of funds by a myriad of decision makers and investors totally outside the control of "the" central authority, its authorization or approval. (One sometimes has the impression that some people in Washington have similar yearnings and complaints.)

2.7 End of Soviet relevance: with a successful implementation of SDI it will become obvious for all that it is the Soviet Union, and not the United States, that cannot afford strategic nuclear disarmament. With the strategic nuclear arms threat gone (i.e., with an effective SDI system, or a zero-zero strategic arms control agreement), the Soviets would lose the last reason why anybody -- even "liberators" in the bushes of equatorial regions -- should take the Soviets seriously. Certainly it is not their technology, nor their market, production, resources or any other power, nor their literature, entertainment, services, etc. (after more than 60 years since the Revolution, can one think of any desirable Soviet technology consumer good?), to which foreign credibility can be attributed. The world would finally discover that without the nuclear fig leaf the Soviet empire/system is naked, an eventuality they necessarily cannot allow. Why the Western media (and, for that matter, Presidential speech writers) have not seen through this more clearly is, in itself, surprising. (So is the seldom-made observation that President Reagan is the first President to have proposed drastic reductions in nuclear armaments. Just because the Soviets find such proposals unacceptable does not mean that the proposals should not be emphasized again and again.)

3. SDI and the German Question

have a profound effect on the long term stabilization of the Central European situation if seen in conjunction with several of the above points.

3.1 A Dual German Choice. Without such a full participation and integration, a dual German choice will continue: integration of West Germany with Western Europe or German Unification under some neutralist flag. The dual soul of the German situation is such that only complete co-equal acceptance of the other two major European partners will give West Germany confidence and security in the Western Alliance, without the lingering attraction of the neutralist posture dangled in front of Germans by the Soviet Union. Anyone doubtful about the objectives of the Soviets along these lines has only to read the Austrian State Treaty of 1956 and the detailed provisions therein as to what the Soviets may have had in mind also for the German question.

3.2 Need for Autonomous European Deterrence A more autonomous approach to European Defense necessarily has to involve intensive West German participation. This is required if one accepts the premise that modern defense research, development, testing and deployment of modern systems require something of the scale of resources as those of the US, the Soviets, and, at some future time, those of China and even Japan. Only a combination of West German, French and British capabilities ever promises the realization of credible, autonomous European defense capabilities -- including independent technology base and production capabilities. This necessarily involves German participation in nuclear systems as a full, equal partner. The situation on this question has changed significantly: whereas in the middle 1950's to the end of the 1960's a certain German drive to achieve nuclear weapons capabilities could be discerned, the situation today seems to change more and more to one where the other two European Allies might well be prepared for such unorthodox thinking, while difficulties may exist in getting the West Germans to accept such novel thoughts and responsibilities.

3.3 Need for West German Interaction The surprising, apparent effect of SOI seems to be the need for substantially expanded European tactical and intermediate range nuclear capabilities and the apparent need or requirement to include German capabilities in these matters as part of an expanded, integrated and autonomous defense capability. The reasoning behind this, once more, is:

- 3.3.1 The exposed German position to tactical and intermediate range Soviet nuclear weapons even with SDI which will require a continued, substantial nuclear counter-capability in Central Europe and which, sooner or later, will require German co-decision on their deployment and use. If not, the field is left wide open for the Soviets to play on the "Austrian" fiddle of neutralism, and a split of Central Europe from Western Europe.
- 3.3.2 The development of a truly autonomous European military technology base requires the same inclusion of German capabilities in all these fields to achieve a resource base at least approaches, if not equals, that of the US.
- 3.3.3 Finally, to anchor the West Germans firmly into the Western European Alliance, and to avoid an increase of the attraction of the "Austrian" solution for all of Central Europe, German capabilities must be included.
- 3.3.4 In the absence of a full integration of West Germany into the strategic force structure of a relatively independent Western European deterrent force, the long term effect of SDI may well be the loosening of the Eastern European hegemony by the Soviets combined with a gradual neutralization of all of Central Europe (including West and East Germany). This development may be acceptable in a regime where the US and the Soviets reach agreement on the overall sharing of SDI technology. However, in the absence of such a drastically changed outlook, an element of confrontation and competition between major powers will persist. Whatever the impact on Eastern Europe, such a neutralization of West Germany seems undesirable from a Western viewpoint and could only be foreclosed by a full co-equal integration of West Germany (as described above) into the West European deterrence structure.

4. US Space Technology Dominance with SDI

On the "negative side, one clearly has to allow for the (correct) European perception that the achievement of SDI will assure the US of dramatic technological advantages which invariably will be translated into market positions in worldwide competition. This, of course, is one good reason for the pursuit of SDI (including supremacy in space matters); it is, however, insufficient reason for Europeans to oppose SDI.

Nothing should prevent Europe from parallel, even dramatic, space technology efforts. At the same time, this relative supremacy of the US will surely cement European adhesion to the US. (If you have them with the SDI, their minds will follow.)

" " "

If the above is a correct statement of the key European issues raised and affected by SDI, a European presentation of SDI in the European context becomes very important to the US, and a campaign of disinformation to the Soviets.

In addition to these specific considerations, all the other items listed in the "Safeguard" memorandum also apply in the European discussion.