Questions & Answers What Threats are Out There? But seriously, who/what is out there to threaten us, now that the Soviet Union is gone? The end of the Cold War did not end the proliferation threat—indeed, it has since accelerated. The U.S. intelligence community estimates over 20 Third World nations have ballistic missiles capable of carrying chemical, biological or even nuclear warheads. With such missiles scattered throughout the world—possibly some on ships, no country is beyond the range of attack. In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton declared the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery is "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States" – and ordered a "national emergency" to deal with this threat. But while the threat grows, the U.S. response – even today, under the George W. Bush administration – is too little, possibly too late. The "rogue nation" threat is very real, e.g., especially from North Korea and Iran – and possibly even from terrorist groups. The June 1998 bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission concluded that any state that wished could, within five years of deciding to build an ICBM, threaten the United States with missile attack. The Clinton Administration rejected this assessment, and continued to claim it would take at least 10-15 years before such a threat could develop. Then, just six weeks later on August 31, 1998, North Korea launched its Taepodong-1 ICBM over Japan and almost to U.S. territory—proving that even an economically destitute rogue state has the where-with-all to attack the U.S. if it wants. Now, Russia and China have been joined by North Korea in selling such rockets on the open market to anyone with money—a source of hard cash, you see. Most recently, as a rude interruption of our July 4, 2006 celebration during our Space Shuttle launch, North Korea launched a volley of ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan – six short and medium-range ballistic missiles were launched successfully and their Taepodong-2 ICBM failed shortly after launch. Click here to read High Frontier’s July 14, 2006, Issue Paper – Six Scuds and a Dud – to see why we should not take comfort in the Taepodong-2 failure and why their 6-for-6 short and medium-range missile demonstration was a great marketing strategy for selling their short and medium range missiles to terrorists. These rogue states want long-range missiles to threaten American cities to blackmail us—and, by threatening their neighbors and our allies, to frustrate our ability to build coalitions in their part of the world. Just imagine the trouble President George H.W. Bush would have had forming the coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1990 had Hussein the ability to threaten U.S. cities—or cities in Europe. The Senate approved our involvement by a margin of only 3 votes, as it was. Thus, at stake is U.S. ability to project power and protect our strategic interests around the world. Effective defenses are needed to counter these growing threats, which could turn deterrence theory against us—i.e., without needed defenses, we will become the deterree rather than remain the deterrer. And as noted above, terrorists, who cannot be deterred – they are pleased to commit suicide – may threaten three-quarters of the U.S. population who live within 200 miles from our coasts with short and medium-range missiles that can be launched from nearby ships. There are numerous scenarios that could send one or more missiles toward U.S. cities—indeed we have come close to such scenarios in real life. In 1995, a Norwegian weather sounding rocket was detected by Russian radar and mistaken by Russia’s military bureaucracy as an unprovoked "first strike" U.S. missile. Someone in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs forgot to tell the Ministry of Defense that the Norwegians had told them the time and place of this entirely benign rocket launch. Although it was seriously considered by then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, he did not respond to this false alarm and order a counter-attack. If the Russians had panicked, this case of mistaken identity could have led to the destruction of one or more American cities. Possible escalation from a crisis looms over the security of the U.S. and its citizens. Recall the Cuban Missile Crisis, an escalation that brought the U.S. and Soviet Union closer to nuclear war than at any other time during the Cold War. This could happen again—China has warned that U.S. efforts to honor its commitments to Taiwan could escalate into a missile strike against U.S. cities—Los Angeles by name. Thankfully, President George W. Bush withdrew from the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty that, for 30 years, prevented the U.S. from deploying already existing technology to build effective defenses to protect all Americans. It is cost us money and time—and its continuing legacy could one day soon cost us dearly in lives and treasure. For years, polls have shown that 60-70 percent of America's citizens are unaware that they are not protected from such attack, and more than 80 percent express outrage when the truth about our lack of a missile defense is presented to them—especially when they learn it is a matter of our national policy to keep them vulnerable. Regrettably, even though the Treaty no longer prevents us from employing the best technology and basing modes to protect America, we continue to follow the emphasis on programs that were selected in an ABM Treaty era when the objective was to avoid an effective defense. Click here to read about the continuing legacy of the 30 years under the ABM Treaty. As with many complex issues, the devil is in the details in building the best defense to ward off current and future missile threats. According to a 1995 Defense Science Board Task Force Report, a particularly troublesome threat involves multiple warheads released early in a ballistic missile's flight—during its "boost-phase"—as its rocket engines burn out. The bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission projected this threat could develop within five years—from 1998. A boost-phase defense is the only sure way to defeat such missiles, by destroying their multiple warheads early—before they are released. The best boost phase defense would be deployed in space. While no boost-phase defense was possible under the constraints of the 1972 ABM Treaty, it is today – especially from space. But there is no program to gain this capability. This de facto adherence to constraints of the abandoned ABM Treaty serious threatens the national security interests of the United States. America’s scientists and engineers should be challenged to build the most cost-effective defenses as quickly as possible. What are the possible solutions??? “We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity do ordain and establish this Constitution of the United States of America.” So begins the U.S. Constitution that all government officials, elected and appointed, are sworn to uphold—among their first defined duties is to "provide for the common defense." Insisting upon the mutual suicide pact that was the basis of the ABM Treaty is completely out of step with the Founders’ stated intent when writing and signing the Constitution on behalf of all American citizens. And it is outrageous that there seems to be adherence to the same principle even after the Treaty is mo more. Undoubtedly, this is why most Americans—about two-thirds, by various polls—are first startled and then become angry when they learn that, as a matter of policy, they are kept vulnerable to ballistic missiles fired deliberately or by accident. Adhering to the mutual assured destruction, aptly called MAD, doctrine that underlay the ABM Treaty seems ludicrous to the average American. Yet our government seems to still want defenses that will not be effective against the Russian or Chinese ballistic missiles – “not to threaten their deterrent,” jargon for continuing to live in a MAD world. America must choose a strategy to protect itself against ballistic missiles with the most cost effective means possible.
Agree on National Policy. Our policy must be to build effective defenses as soon as possible Actually, the Clinton Administration inherited such a policy—approved by a Democratic-controlled Congress—but quickly abandoned it and put effective defenses on the back burner. The Clinton administration asserted there was no pressing threat—except for building theater defenses for our overseas troops, friends and allies. Even there, only defenses that clearly could not also defend America were developed—others that could do both were stalled or canceled. In 1996, Congress passed a Missile Defense Act calling for defending America—and President Clinton vetoed it. In 1999, Congress passed by veto-proof margins a Missile Defense Act directing that effective defenses be built as soon as technologically feasible—this time President Clinton signed the mandate into law. But then he claimed the words didn’t really mean what they said—and he continued to delay a decision to deploy any defense whatsoever during the remainder of his term—never mind effective defenses were called for by law. Furthermore, a ground-based site was chosen in 1997 as the primary basis of this decision—then designated to be made just before the 2000 election. It was picked more to make only minor changes to the ABM Treaty rather than because of its effectiveness, cost or the speed with which it could (and can) be built. The original intent was to conduct R&D for three years and then, if the threat warranted it, deploy in another three years. We watched the Clinton administration’s so-called "3 + 3" program morph into a "3 + 5" program – as the estimated cost of the first site doubled, doubled again, and then doubled yet a third time to something on the order of $25 billion—incidentally, what a single ground-based site was known to cost at the beginning of the Clinton Administration. Regrettably, the George W. Bush administration chose only to make marginal changes to the Clinton administration’s charade that responded to polls showing that Americans favor building defenses rather than not building them. But this program was designed to fail—to self-destruct. And that plan still is playing itself out as costs continue to escalate, testing is inadequate (no successful intercept attempt in four years) and other weaknesses of ground-based only defenses are being acknowledged. In spite of claims to the contrary, this is not an effective approach. It would be a far better investment to emphasize sea-based defenses which are 8-out-of-9 in their testing under increasingly realistic operational conditions (as of August 2006). (The Navy receives about 10-percent of the missile defense budget – that should be doubled to accelerate and improve the development activities.) Operational cruisers and destroyers with the inherent potential to protect the United States are being deployed to the Sea of Japan to protect our ally from North Korean missiles – for a relatively minor investment (~$25 million for developing, qualifying and installing needed software modifications), these same ships could be given an ability to shoot down North Korean missiles while as they fly overhead on their way toward targets in Hawaii or the Northwestern United States. Build Effective Defenses As Soon As Possible If competent engineers were to seek to build effective defenses without the political burdens of the legacy of the ABM Treaty, it is doubtful they would begin with ground-based defenses—that take shots only as attacking warheads and associated decoys approach their intended targets. First, competent engineers know layered defenses are required if the defense is to be effective—and the first shot should be taken as early as possible, preferably while the attacking rocket is rising from its launch pad and before it can release its (possibly multiple) deadly warheads. Subsequent layers would take shots at the attacking missiles and their warheads as they transit space and begin their decent toward their intended targets. And competent engineers would want as many shots as possible to assure the best defense possible. Second, engineers would observe that they do not know where or when a missile might be launched toward the U.S.—so, they would want a global defense that would not be sensitive to that uncertainty. After examining any schoolchild’s globe, they would notice that most of the world is covered by water—and a little checking would show that the U.S. Navy has ships in international waters around the world today, and they could be used as platforms for defensive interceptors. Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers can launch defensive interceptors to defend the fleet against aircraft and cruise missile attack. All that is needed is to provide ballistic missile-defense interceptors to be launched from the very same vertical launch system (VLS) used for the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Standard Missile used for air defense. Happily, the Navy has been conducting an impressive test program, and operational capability is now going to sea. We need to accelerate this effective program and make the Navy systems all they can be. Preferably, this program should be moved from the Missile Defense Agency to the Navy’s Aegis Program Office and fully funded as an operational capability to be subject to block improvements as needed. Forward-based ships could launch interceptors to destroy attacking missiles in their ascent phase, when they are still going up. In some cases, they could hit them in their boost-phase before their rockets burn out. Ships in mid-ocean and nearer the U.S. coastline could hit attacking missiles outside the Earth’s atmosphere and after they begin decent toward the U.S. homeland. The American taxpayer has already bought most of the infrastructure required for such a sea-based defense—and existing air defenses and modernization programs only need to be modified to defend against ballistic missiles. The additional cost for providing a sea-based ballistic missile defense capability is minimal—much less than just the latest cost growth in the ground-based NMD system. And—get this— sea-based defenses are beginning operations now—with a much better testing record than has been amassed by ground-based defense development efforts. This is a no-brainer from an engineering point-of-view. Sea-based defenses are clearly the place to begin building a global defense for Americans at home and for our overseas troops, friends and allies. Subsequent layers of the effective defense could be based in the air, in space, and on the ground. The Pentagon should reinstate a serious space-based defense program with needed resources to re-assemble as much as possible of the team that was working on space-based interceptors 15 years ago and work rapidly to build the needed space-based defenses. Again High Frontier’s preference would be to remove this program from the Missile Defense Agency because of their infatuation with ground-based defenses. Perhaps the Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) would be the most appropriate place to take charge of this important effort. America’s political leaders must make clear that they intend to live up to their oaths to provide for the common defense. The ABM Treaty stands in the way, and it must go—cooperatively if possible, unilaterally if necessary. But it must go—very soon, so American engineers can build truly effective defenses their genius makes possible.
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